In this paper, we propose a simple monitor that utilizes Inertial Navigation System (INS) to detect spoofing attacks on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). It is an innovation-based monitor that can be implemented into positioning systems using a loosely-coupled INS-GNSS integration in a Kalman filter, which is consistent with both GroundBased and Space-Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS and SBAS). The main contribution of this paper is the development of a framework that integrates the monitor (detector) and estimator, which provides a fully stochastic integrity risk analysis. The performance of the monitor is evaluated in presence of a spoofer capable of tracking and estimating the aircraft position, and computing the worst-case sequence of GNSS fault. Utilizing this worst-case fault, we simulated GBASassisted final approach of Boeing 747. The simulation results demonstrate that unless the spoofers position-tracking devices have unrealistic accuracy, the proposed monitor efficiently detects spoofing attacks and meets the most stringent integrity requirements in aviation applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing attack can be a critical threat to positioning integrity, particularly during an aircraft's final approach where the consequences are potentially catastrophic. In this paper, we propose a novel Inertial Navigation System (INS) spoofing monitor and statistically validate its performance against worst-case spoofing attacks, even when the spoofer has the ability to estimate the real-time position of the aircraft. Our specific application of interest is aircraft landing approaches assisted by Ground-Based and Space-Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS and SBAS), but the methods introduced here are also applicable to other GNSS positioning systems.
GNSS spoofing is a process whereby an external agent tries to control the position output of a GNSS receiver by deliberately broadcasting a counterfeit signal. The spoofed signal mimics the original GNSS signal with higher power and thus may go unnoticed by measurement screening techniques used within the receiver. As a result, the trajectory of the target user can be controlled through the fake broadcast signals [12] . Numerous anti-spoofing techniques have been developed and vulnerability of these existing methods have been discussed in [18, 19] . These include cryptographic authentication techniques employing modified GNSS navigation data [20] [21] [22] , spoofing discrimination using spatial processing by antenna arrays and automatic gain control schemes [23] [24] [25] , GNSS signal direction of arrival comparison [26] , code and phase rate consistency checks [27] , high-frequency antenna motion [13] , and signal power monitoring techniques [28, 29] . Augmenting data from auxiliary sensors such as Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) and independent radar sensors to discriminate the spoofing have also been proposed in [31] [32] [33] . The first thorough description of the performance of IMU-based monitoring against worst-case spoofing attacks in terms of integrity risk was first introduced by us in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] .
The INS detector introduced in [1] [2] [3] monitors discrepancies between GNSS spoofed measurements and INS measurements. The basis for the detector is a tightly coupled integration of GNSS measurements and INS kinematic models using a weighted least squares batch estimator. Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) concepts are implemented using the time history of estimator residuals for spoofing detection. The redundancy required for detection is provided through INS measurements, unlike conventional usage of RAIM, where detection is provided through satellite redundancy [11] . Using the residual-based detector it is possible to analytically determine the worst-case sequence of spoofed GNSS measurements -that is, the spoofed GNSS signal profile that maximizes integrity risk [7] .
In [1] , we illustrated how a spoofer can inject faults slowly into the GNSS measurements such that they corrupt the tightly coupled solution while going unnoticed by the INS detector. It was also shown that if the spoofer knows the exact trajectory of an aircraft, he or she might eventually cause errors large enough to exceed hazard safety limits, again without triggering an alarm from the INS detector. However, it was acknowledged that in reality, the user's actual trajectory would always deviate from a prescribed path (e.g., a straight line final approach) due to natural disturbances such as wind gusts and aircraft autopilot response to control actions. Deviations from the nominal trajectory due to these disturbances, which were assumed to be unknown to the spoofer, would enhance detection capability of the INS monitor.
In [2, 3] , we generalized the spoofing integrity analysis by deriving the statistical dynamic response of an aircraft to a well-established vertical wind gust power spectrum. The main contribution of that work was the development of a rigorous methodology to compute upper bounds on the integrity risk resulting from a worst-case spoofing attack -without needing to simulate individual aircraft approaches with an unmanageably large number specific gust disturbance profiles (e.g., 10 9 to meet aircraft landing integrity requirements [34] ). In [4] , we investigated the impact on spoofing detection due to aircraft's response to control actions (actuated by the autopilot) due to the spoofed GNSS signals. In response to the manipulated position state estimates, the aircraft autopilot commands accelerations (forces) to maneuver the aircraft to the spoofer's desired trajectory. As with the wind gust case, the controller response results in transient behavior immediately sensed by the INS, but absent in the spoofed signal. We showed that even without exposure to wind gusts, autopilot reactions to the spoofer's input significantly enhance INS detection of the spoofing attack.
One assumption made in [1] [2] [3] [4] is that the spoofer knows that the aircraft may use INS to detect spoofing attacks, but has no real-time knowledge of the actual aircraft position during spoofing attack. In [5, 6] , we considered spoofers capable of 1) tracking and estimating the position of the target aircraft and, 2) deriving a worst-case fault profile that maximizes the integrity risk. Unlike the prior work, which used a batch estimator to derive the worst-case fault profile, we utilize the more realistic Kalman filter estimator in deriving the worstcase fault profile. In [6] , we also introduced a stochastic methodology for the spoofer to account for his/her own tracking sensor errors in his/her worst-case fault derivation, which accounts for a maximum level of awareness on the part of the spoofer. The covariance analysis results demonstrated that unless the position-tracking devices have unrealistic accuracy, the proposed INS monitor is effective in detecting worst-case spoofing attacks with low integrity risk.
In the prior work [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , both the differential code and carrier measurements were assumed available for use directly in the airborne Kalman filter estimator, which is common for precision relative navigation systems such as shipboard landing [8] and autonomous airborne refueling [9] . On the other hand, in this current work we assume only the differential carrier-smoothed code measurements are available at the aircraft, which is consistent with both GBAS and SBAS avionics implementations. In this configuration, instead of the code and carrier measurements, GBAS position solution obtained from a GNSS-only weighted least squares estimation is fed into a Kalman filter in a loosely-coupled INS-GNSS integration scheme. In this work, the proposed monitor and the Kalman filter-based worst-case fault derivation are extended for the loosely-coupled INS-GNSS integration. Utilizing this worstcase fault, we simulate a GBAS-assisted landing approaches of B747 and investigate the minimum accuracy levels of the spoofer's position tracking to achieve unacceptably large integrity risks. The simulation results show that even when the spoofer have the full knowledge of the GBAS system to take into account in his/her spoofed measurement computation, the monitor performance is still efficient in detecting worst-case spoofing attacks with low integrity risk unless the spoofer has unrealistic position tracking accuracy. 
II. INS AIRBORNE MONITOR
GNSS and INS can be coupled using a variety of integration schemes. These can range from the simple loosely coupled integration, to the complex ultra-tightly coupled mode in which the INS directly aids the GNSS tracking loops [30] . Unlike the prior work [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] assumed a tightly-coupled INS-GNSS integration in a Kalman filter, to be consistent with the GBAS and SBAS-assisted landing approaches, this work assumes a loosely-coupled integration where the GBAS position solution (obtained from a weighted least squares estimator using differential carrier-smoothed code ⇢) is directly fed to a Kalman filter that calibrates INS (Fig. 1) .
A. GBAS-assisted Weighted Least Squares Estimator
The GBAS measurement equation linearized about a nominal position, is represented for the k th time epoch as
where ⇢ k is the differentially corrected carrier-smoothed code measurement vector, e k is the line of sight matrix, r k is the deviation on the position of the aircraft relative to the reference station, t k is the receiver clock error relative to the receiver of the reference station, c is the speed of light,
is a vector containing the errors in ⇢ k . Utilizing the measurement model in (1), the weighted least squares estimater LS k of the position is obtained bŷ
where T r is the transformation matrix that extracts the position r k from the augmented GNSS state vector [r k , ct k ] T and G + k is the weighted pseudo-inverse matrix of G k
Definingr LS k = r k +r LS k and substituting (1) into (2), we can obtain the least squares estimation errorr
B. Loosely-coupled Kalman Filter Estimator Discrete form of the INS process model is obtained in Appendix A as
where
T is referred to as the INS state vector including deviations in position vector r, velocity vector v, attitude vector E, and IMU bias vector b.
is the state transition matrix of the process model, and is the discrete input coefficient matrix.ũ is the IMU measurement vector, and w k ⇠ N (0, W k ) is the INS process noise vector.
A Kalman filter in a loosely-coupled integration utilizes the GNSS position solution as a measurement to calibrate INS error states. In this work, GBAS provides the GNSS position solutionr LS k obtained from the weighted least squares estimator in (2) . The measurement model of the Kalman filter in the loosely-coupled architecture has the typical form
where x 0 k refers to all the states in x k except r k . The main assumption in a Kalman filter is that the measurements are uncorrelated over time. On the other hand, r LS k in (6) are time-correlated. The reason is that the GBAS measurement noise ✏ in (1) is time-correlated due to the prior hatch (smoothing) filtering. Assuming time constant of the hatch filter is larger than that of the multipath (⌧ h > ⌧ m ), the time correlation of the measurement noise ✏ can be captured with a first-order Gauss Markov process driven with a white noise  ⇠ N (0, K) as 2
where t and ⌧ h are the GNSS receiver sampling time and the hatch filter time constant, respectively. The components of ✏ and  superscripted from 1 to n are the errors corresponding to the measurements obtained from different satellites. The measurement error covariance V k is a diagonal matrix obtained from the hatch filter at steady-state. The error models to construct V k are defined as a function of elevation of each satellite in GBAS [35] . Incorparating this steady-state value of V k in the process model (7), the driving noise covariance matrix K k is obtained as
To capture the correlation in Kalman filter equations, we first obtain a zero-noise measurement model by substituting (4) into (6) and augmenting the colored noise ✏ k into the state vector as [38] 
Then, we also augment the Gauss Markov process model for ✏ in (7) with the INS process model in (5) as
Given the augmented process model in (10), the Kalman filter time update is
where x KF k is the a priori estimate of x at time epoch k.
The measurement update at time epoch k gives the a posteriori estimatex k aŝ
where L k is the Kalman gain at time epoch k, and optimally computed by the aircraft estimator as
and P x k is the pre-measurement estimate error covariance of x k and is obtained as
andP x k is the post-measurement estimate error covariance of x k and computed aŝ
C. Kalman Filter-based INS Monitor
We use an innovation-based INS monitor, which utilizes Kalman filter in a loosely-coupled INS-GNSS integration. The innovation vector at time epoch k is defined as
Cumulative test statistic q at time epoch k is defined as the sum of weighted norm of the innovation vectors as
where S i is innovation vector covariance matrix
The proposed INS monitor checks whether the test statistic q k is smaller than a pre-defined threshold T 2 as Fig. 2 . Impact of the position fault and the consequent autopilot response to the spoofing attack on aircraft trajectory. The dotted line is the nominal or planned approach trajectory, the blue line represents the faulty positions injected by the spoofer, the red line is the steady-state trajectory that the aircraft will maneuver and reach to after responding to the spoofed signal, and the black curve is the actual flight path deviated from the nominal due to autopilots response to the spoofing attack. Note that the blue and red trajectories are symmetric about the nominal approach line.
Under fault free conditions, the test statistic q k is centrally chi-square distributed with 3k degrees of freedom. For a given false alarm requirement, the threshold T 2 is determined from the inverse cumulative chi-square distribution. The INS monitor alarms for a fault if q k > T 2 . Under faulted conditions, q k is non-centrally chi-square distributed with a non-centrality
which is used to evaluate the performance of the monitor by computing the probability of missed detection.
III. MONITOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we derive an evaluation model for the performance of the proposed monitor by fusing the spoofed measurements into the loosely-coupled Kalman filter estimator and detector derived in the previous section. Using this evaluation model, we derive a methodology to quantify the performance of the INS monitor in terms of integrity risk under worst-case spoofing attacks with aircraft position tracking.
A. Evaluation Model for Spoofing Monitor Performance
To quantify the impact of the spoofing attack with position tracking on the proposed monitor performance, we construct a Kalman filter-based estimation error model capturing the impact of the spoofed measurements that contain the spoofer's tracking sensor errors and fault.
In a spoofing attack, the spoofer broadcasts raw code and carrier signals, which mimics the actual GNSS signals with an additional fault Equation (21) assumes that the spoofer preserves the consistency in the code and carrier signals by using the same fault for both the code and carrier signals. Otherwise, the spoofing attack detected by the Code Carrier Divergence (CCD) airborne monitors in [10] . Also, the spoofer's position estimation errorr s in (21) is modeled as a white Gaussian noise additive to the computed fault f k , which is a conservative assumption. The reason is that, filtering or smoothing the tracking noise will automatically cause a delay between the spoofer's position estimate and the aircraft's actual dynamic response to the spoofing attack (actuated by autopilot), which will be eventually reflected as an inconsistency between INS and GNSS measurements and improve the detection capability of the monitor [4] .
It can be shown that the resultant fault f 0 k term in (21) will not be smoothed out by the airborne hatch filter (Fig. 3) since it is the same for the spoofed code and carrier signals. Therefore, the spoofed carrier-smoothed code ⇢ s k (output of the filter) can be expressed as
where ⇢ k is the original carrier-smoothed code for the spooffree case.
Substituting (1) into (22) gives the spoofed carrier-smoothed code measurement
Replacing the actual measurement ⇢ k in (1) with the spoofed measurement ⇢ s k in (23) and re-deriving the equations from (2) to (9) yield a spoofed measurement model for the Kalman filter estimator aŝ
Substituting (24) in (12) gives the Kalman filter measurement update as a function of the fault aŝ
Substituting the Kalman filter time update equation (11) 
Let us define the state estimate error asx
Subtracting the INS process model (10) from (26) gives the state estimate error dynamics as
Similarly, the innovation vector under a spoofing attack is obtained by substituting (24) into (16) as
Augmenting the state estimate error model in (27) , and the innovation model in (28) results in a performance evaluation model capturing the impact of the error in spoofer's tracking sensors and the fault on the state estimate error, and the innovation:
where y is defined as the augmented state vector of the evaluation model capturing the estimate error and innovation dynamics. y , ⌥ y , and y are the augmented state transition, noise coefficient, and fault input coefficient matrices, respectively.
Using (29) , the mean E[y k ] and covariance Y k of the evaluation model state vector y can be propagated as
B. Spoofing Integrity Risk
In this work, integrity risk is used as a metric to quantify the performance of the spoofing monitor. Integrity risk is defined as the probability that the aircraft state estimate error (e.g., altitude error) exceeds an alert limit without being detected (i.e. q < T 2 ). Given spoofing hypothesis H s , integrity risk at time epoch k is expressed in terms of a cumulative test statistic q k and the altitude estimate error " k as
where l is the vertical alert limit, and T 2 is pre-defined threshold for detection which is the same as that in (19) .
Since the error in altitude is the most critical in landing approach and vertical requirements are usually the most stringent, it is convenient to evaluate the performance with respect to vertical direction only. The error associated with the altitude " k can be extracted fromx k using the row transformation vector T " as " k = T "xk (33) where " k is normally distributed. Cumulative test statistic q k in (17) is expressed in vector form as ) where S k is the innovation covariance obtained from Y k in (31) as
where T extracts the rows of y k corresponding to k . Similarly, non-centrality parameter 2 of the cumulative test statistic in (20) is
Using the Kalman filter-based evaluation model in (29) , it is proved in [5] that E[x i T j ] = 0 for all i j. Therefore, the cumulative test statistic q k obtained from innovations and the altitude error " k obtained from the current state estimate error will be statistically independent. As a result, the integrity risk I r k can be written as a product of two probabilities as
C. Kalman Filter-based Worst-case Fault Derivation A worst-case fault derivation based on a Kalman filter estimator using tightly-coupled INS-GNSS integration was first introduced by the authors in [5, 6] . This derivation provides an analytical solution to the worst-case fault profile that maximizes the Kalman filter estimate error associated with the most hazardous state " k while minimizing the cumulative test statistic q k or in other words, maximizing the integrity risk.
In this work, we incorporate the same methodology to obtain a worst-case fault solution for the GBAS systems utilizing loosely-coupled INS-GNSS integration in a Kalman filter. The worst case fault history vector f 00 w 1:k that maximizes the failure mode slope E[" k ] 2 / 2 k was derived in [5] as
where A k and B 1:k are the constant matrices defined in [5] as functions of the deterministic Kalman filter parameters as
and
i , and L i for i = 1, 2, .., k can be extracted using the evaluation model in (29) , and n is the number of Kalman filter measurements at each time epoch (n = 3 in the loosely-coupled integration).
The magnitude ↵ in (38) is a scalar that is determined to maximize the integrity risk I r k in (37), which is influenced by the spoofer's position tracking sensor noiser s . In Sections III-A and III-B, we explained how to compute the joint probability Pr |" k | > l, q k < T 2 for a given deterministic errorr s . To statistically account forr s in the worst-case fault derivation, we generate m number of samplesr ) and compute the integrity risk for different values of ↵ as defined in [6] :
(41) The worst-case value for the fault magnitude ↵ is determined through one dimensional search to maximize I r k (↵) in (41).
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS RESULTS
To test the performance of the proposed INS spoofing monitor, a covariance analysis with a B747 flight on GBASassisted approach is simulated at the standard trimmed flight conditions at 131 knots [17] . The aviation-grade IMU sensor specifications and the parameters for the GBAS error model defined in Appendix B are provided in Table I and Table II , respectively. We assume that the airborne estimator has been running at fault free conditions and has reached steady state before the spoofing attack starts.
To quantify the impact of the spoofing attack period on the integrity risk, we obtained the worst-case fault profiles for different attack periods ranging from 152 to 232 s and computed the corresponding integrity risks assuming the spoofer has perfect position tracking sensors (i.e.,r s k = 0). As seen in Fig. 4 , increasing the attack period causes higher integrity risks. The reason is that, increasing the spoofing time allows the spoofer to inject faults to the system in a less aggressive way, slowly corrupting the estimation of INS states and thereby reducing the monitors ability to detect the spoofing attack. On the other hand, even though we conservatively assumed that the spoofer tracks the aircraft position with zero-error, the worst-case spoofing fault for a standard B747 approach of 150 s results in an integrity risk of less than 10 9 , which satisfies the most stringent safety requirement in aviation [34] .
The results so far assume that the spoofer is able to estimate the exact position of the aircraft. In a more realistic scenario, the errors in position tracking must be accounted for. Therefore, we assume that the spoofers position estimate error is a zero-mean white noiser s k sequence. White noise is typical for laser tracking errors. Utilizing (41), we illustrate how the INS monitor leverages the spoofers altitude tracking errors to detect spoofing attacks. Fig. 5 shows that for a position tracking error of more than 6 cm (1-), the integrity risk always remains below 10 9 for spoofing attacks having a period of up to 200 s. This 200 s attack period is conservative since the standard B747 approach is 150 s and the spoofer have a limited range. The results are promising because such tracking accuracy is high considering existing high-grade position tracking systems (e.g., laser, radar, vision). Also, maintaining this high tracking accuracy during whole approach of the aircraft is unrealistic due to uncertainties in the lever arm from the GNSS antenna location to the spoofer's measuring point on the aircraft. The covariance analysis so far demonstrates the performance of the INS monitor using loosely-coupled systems (i.e., GBAS). The monitor performance for tightly-coupled systems (i.e., shipboard landing and autonomous airborne refueling) was shown in the prior work [5, 6] . Fig. 6 compares detection capability of the monitor implemented with the loosely and tightly-coupled systems. The left plot shows the integrity risk values as a function of the spoofing attack period in presence of worst-case spoofing attacks with perfect position tracking. The plot shows that the loosely coupled INS/GNSS integration results in a better integrity than the tightly-coupled integration does. The reason is that the tightly-coupled integration scheme gives the spoofer better opportunity to fuse the GNSS spoofing fault into the system and thereby corrupt the IMU biases. On the other hand, in a more realistic scenario where the spoofer has position tracking errors, the right plot illustrates that the monitor with the tightly-coupled systems is more sensitive to the spoofer's tracking errors than that with the loosely-coupled systems. For example, for the same spoofing attack period (200 s), the tracking error (1-) resulting in a 10 9 integrity risk is 4 mm in the tightly-coupled systems, whereas it is 60 mm in the loosely-coupled systems.
V. CONCLUSION
This work proposed a monitor to detect spoofing attacks during GBAS and SBAS-assisted aircraft final approaches. It is an innovation-based monitor using loosely-coupled IMU sensors and GNSS receivers. To evaluate the performance of the monitor, we first established a stochastic spoofing integrity analysis methodology, then obtained the worst-case spoofing fault that maximizes the integrity risk. The B747 simulation results show that even when the spoofer achieves the worst-case scenario by closed-loop tracking of the aircraft position, the monitor is still highly effective in detecting spoofing attacks during GBAS-assisted approaches with low integrity risk. Also, different INS/GNSS integration schemes were evaluated by quantifying trade-offs between the loosely and tightly-coupled navigation systems. It was found that the tightly-coupled INS/GNSS monitor is more sensitive to the spoofer's tracking errors.
GBAS ERROR MODELS
In this section, standard error models for GBAS differential processing are given based on Ground Accuracy Designator-C (GAD-C) and Airborne Accuracy Designator-B (AAD-B). The total GBAS measurement error vector ✏ in (1) has a diagonal covariance matrix V = 
where (✓ j ) is the standard deviation of the total GBAS measurement error corresponding to j th satellite, ✓ is the elevation angle, n is the total number of satellites.
is a function of elevation angle of satellites and composed of airborne a , ground station g , tropospheric t , and ionospheric i standard deviations [35] (✓) = 
and m is modeled as [35] m (✓) = 0.13 + 0.53 e ✓ /10 o
The residual tropospheric error for the airborne equipment t is computed as [35] t (✓) = N h 
where N is the refractivity uncertainty transmitted by ground subsystem, h 0 is the tropospheric scale height, and h is the height of the aircraft above the GBAS reference point.
The ionospheric error model is given as [35] i (✓) = F p ri (x a + 2⌧ h v a )
where ri is the standard deviation for the nominal ionospheric vertical spatial gradient, x a is the slant range distance between current aircraft location and the ground station, v a is the horizontal aircraft velocity, and F p is the vertical-to-slant obliquity factor defined as [35] F p = 1 s where h I is the ionospheric shell height.
The total ground station error is composed of the ground reference receiver errors g,r and the signal-in-space errors g,s as [37] g (✓) = 
where M is the number of reference station antennas. The total ground reference receiver error including noise and multipath is modeled as [37] g,r (✓) = 
and the ground signal-in-space errors are modeled as [37] g,s (✓) = q 0.04 2 + 0.01 2 F p (56)
